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Abstract—In service based systems, there is often a need to 
replace services at runtime as they become either unavailable or 
they no longer meet required quality or security properties. In 
such cases, it is often necessary to build compositions of services 
that can replace a problematic service because no single service 
with a sufficient match to it can be located. In this paper, we 
present an approach for building compositions of services that 
can preserve required security properties. Our approach is based 
on the use of secure composition patterns which are applied in 
connection with basic discovery mechanisms to build secure 
service compositions.  
 
Index Terms — software service security, secure service 
composition 
I. INTRODUCTION  
In service based systems (SBS) – i.e., systems that provide 
their functionality by orchestrating external software services 
outside their own control and ownership – there is often a need 
to replace services which become unavailable or no longer 
meet required quality (e.g., performance) or security 
properties (e.g., confidentiality, availability, privacy) at 
runtime. In such cases, sometimes it is not possible to find 
single substitute services for the one which should be 
replaced. A possible way for addressing such cases is to 
attempt to build a composition of services that could replace 
the problematic service. 
A fundamental challenge associated with such cases is the 
need to ensure that all security properties, which are required 
from an SBS and have to do with the service to be replaced, 
are taken into account whilst identifying suitable 
compositions. 
Addressing security properties in runtime service 
composition has received little attention in the literature (e.g., 
[9][10]) and, to the best of our knowledge, existing work does 
not provide a comprehensive solution to the problem. The 
work we present in this paper is aimed at addressing this gap. 
Our approach is based on patterns of service composition 
that are known to preserve certain security properties and can 
be applied at runtime in order to find secure service 
compositions. These patterns specify abstract and parametric 
specifications of service workflows, preconditions for their 
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application and security implication rules. These rules express 
formally proven logical implications between security 
properties and, during the composition process, they are used 
to infer the security properties which would need to be 
satisfied by individual services in order to guarantee some 
other security property required of the composition as a whole. 
Once identified the security properties required of individual 
services within a composition are fed into a discovery tool 
which identifies candidate services that satisfy the properties.  
The approach that we present in this paper extends a tool 
that has been developed at City University to support the 
discovery of services at runtime based on criteria referring to 
the interface (i.e., inputs and outputs), behaviour and quality 
properties of services [17]. This tool supports runtime 
discovery in two modes: a reactive and a proactive mode. In 
the reactive (or “pull”) mode, services are discovered only 
when a need for them arises. In the proactive (or “push”) 
mode, service discovery queries are provided to the tool for 
each of the constituent services of an SBS. These queries are 
executed in parallel with the operation of an SBS to identify 
and maintain up-to-date sets of candidate services that could 
be used to replace the constituent services of the SBS when 
any of them fails. The push mode has been shown to improve 
significantly the efficiency of the discovery process [17]. 
Service composition should also be applied in push mode as it 
is computationally expensive and cannot be expected to 
produce timely results if applied reactively. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Sect. II we 
present a scenario for service composition which we use in the 
rest of the paper to exemplify our approach. In Sect. III, we 
introduce the secure service composition patterns. In Sect. IV, 
we describe the process of applying these patterns to generate 
compositions that preserve security properties. Finally, in 
Sect. V we overview related work and in Sect. VI we provide 
some concluding remarks. 
II. SCENARIO 
To exemplify our approach, in the rest of the paper we use a 
scenario where a composition of services needs to be built in 
order to replace a service S acting as a broker for car hire 
companies and providing quotes for hiring cars. S takes as 
input the profile of a driver (i.e., a parameter of type Person) 
and produces a personalized offer based on car hire companies 
that are within a given distance of the driver’s address. A 
security property regarding S is that the confidentiality of any 
input information passed to it must be preserved as it contains 
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 personal driver information (i.e., his/her full name, day of 
birth and address).  
Our approach assumes that in an SBS using service S 
designers must have specified a query QS that can be executed 
to find a replacement of S if S becomes unavailable or 
malfunctions at runtime. At runtime, if after executing QS 
there is no single service matching QS’s conditions, a 
composition that could replace S should be found. An example 
of a composition in this case could involve two services: 
CompanyLoc and BrowseOffer. In this composition, 
CompanyLoc is a car hire company locator service taking as 
input the address of person, who needs to hire the car, and 
returns the closest car hire companies to that address. 
BrowseOffer gets quotes for hiring cars from the located 
companies and enables their browsing.  
To preserve the confidentiality of driver data, in this 
example, all the data that is passed to CompanyLoc as well as 
any information that is derived from these data and would be 
passed from CompanyLoc to BrowseOffer and/or stored by 
any of these services should remain confidential.  
III. SECURE COMPOSITION PATTERNS  
Our approach uses secure composition patterns to drive the 
process of constructing secure workflows of services. A secure 
composition pattern specifies an abstract elementary workflow 
of activities, that should be provided by individual services (or 
further compositions of services), and the control and data 
flows connecting these activities. An example of an 
elementary workflow is the sequential workflow in which 
services are composed in chains and invoked sequentially to 
achieve the required functionality outcome [1][2]. 
In addition to the actual workflow, a secure composition 
pattern specifies: (a) the overall security property(ies) that a 
workflow can ensure subject to the security properties of the 
services bound to the individual activities in it, (b) suitability 
conditions that must be satisfied in order to apply the 
workflow, and (c) dependencies between the inputs and 
outputs of the different activities of the workflow (referred to 
as IO dependencies in the following).  
Two examples of secure composition patterns are shown in 
Fig. 1. The first of these patterns is the Secure Sequence 
Pattern (SSP). This pattern contains two abstract activities, 
namely A and B, and control flows between them (shown as 
solid arrowed lines) indicating that activity A should be 
executed and completed before B. The pattern specifies also 
data flows showing that the inputs of the service that the 
pattern may be used to replace (IN) may be used only partially 
by A (inA) and B (inB). The IO dependencies specified for SSP 
indicate that the inputs passed to activity A should be a subset 
of IN (inA ⊆ IN), the inputs to activity B should be a subset of 
IN and the output of A (inB ⊆ IN+outA) and the output of the 
final activity of the pattern (B) should be a superset of the 
outputs that the pattern will replace (OUT ⊆ outB).   
Security properties are represented as relations over patterns 
or services and the data consumed, produced, or stored by 
them (i.e., the input, output, and persistent internal data, 
respectively). Our approach uses a built-in but extensible 
ontology of relations of the form <relation>( 
<service/pattern>, <data>) in order to express security 
properties. The confidentiality of the inputs and outputs of the 
sequential pattern is expressed, for example, by the relations 
conf(self, IN) and conf(self,OUT), respectively. 
 
SECURE SEQUENCE PATTERN 
 
SECURITY PROPERTIES 
Conf(self,IN), Conf(self, OUT) 
IO DEPENDENCIES FOR A 
input: inA ⊆ IN 
IO DEPENDENCIES FOR B 
input: inB ⊆ IN+outA  
output: OUT ⊆ outB 
 
SECURE BOOLEAN CHOICE 
PATTERN 
 
SUITABILITY CONDITIONS 
∃ in’ ⊆ IN: 
if (in’) then execute(A) 
else execute(B) 
SECURITY PROPERTIES 
Conf(self,IN), Conf(self, OUT) 
IO DEPENDENCIES FOR A 
input: inA ⊆ IN 
output: OUT ⊆ outA 
IO DEPENDENCIES FOR B 
input: inB ⊆ IN 
output: OUT ⊆ outB 
 
Fig. 1.  Examples of secure composition patterns 
The security properties of a secure composition pattern are 
used in order to check the applicability of the pattern during 
the service composition process. In particular, the patterns are 
retrieved and applied during the search for a composition (see 
Sect. IV) only if the security properties that they satisfy match 
with the security properties specified in the discovery query of 
the service that the composition is to replace. Following the 
selection of a secure composition pattern, during the 
application of the pattern, its IO dependencies are used as 
querying conditions for discovering services that could match 
the individual activities in the pattern.  
The ability of a pattern to guarantee the security properties 
included in its specification depends on the actions that the 
activities of the pattern may perform on the data handled by 
the pattern. To ensure the confidentiality of input data in the 
sequential pattern, for example, it is necessary to ensure: (a) 
the confidentiality of the data transmitted from A to B (i.e., 
outA), and (b) the confidentiality of the data stored by A (i.e., 
dA) if outA and dA may disclose information about inA (and 
consequently IN) and A derives any of these data from inA. To 
express such conditions regarding the preservation of security 
properties, it is necessary to specify actions that pattern 
activities or the individual services which instantiate them 
perform on data. These actions are specified by the so called 
security-related actions. 
Table I lists the different types of actions that may affect 
security. As shown in the table an activity/service may: project 
a given set of data D over some of the properties of these data 
(Project(D,D’)); select a subset of data D’ from D without 
affecting their structure of the original data (Select(D,D’)); 
derive data D’ from a given set of data D in a way that 
 discloses information about a specific set of properties {P} of 
D (Derive(D,D’,{P})): store or alter D data in a persistent store 
(Store(D,L) and Alter(D,L)); and/or retrieve D data from a 
persistent store (Retrieve(D,L)) 
TABLE I 
SECURITY-RELATED ACTIONS ON DATA 
Action  Explanation 
Project(D, D’) Subgraph(Type(D’),Type(D)) 
Select(D, D’) Extension(D’) ⊆ Extension(D) 
Derive(D, D’, {P}) D’ is derived from D in a way disclosing info about 
the set of properties {P} in the type of D  
Store(D, L) Data D are kept in persistent store L 
Retrieve(D, L) Data D are retrieved from persistent store L 
Alter(D, L) Data D are altered in persistent store L  
 
In some cases the actions performed on data are specified 
for the individual activities at the pattern level. In the 
sequential pattern of Fig. 1, for example, it is specified that 
activities A and B store data (see Store(dA,S1) and Store 
(dB,S2)). In other cases, however, the pattern itself might not 
specify conditions about the actions that its abstract activities 
may perform on data. 
As discussed earlier, the ability of a pattern to guarantee 
certain security properties depends on the actions that the 
individual services, which will be bound to the activities of the 
pattern, perform on the data and the security properties that 
hold for these individual services. These dependencies are 
expressed by security implication rules.  
As an example, consider the confidentiality property. A 
security implication rule should express that, if the data D, 
used in an activity A as an input or an output, is derived from 
another data D’, that was required to be confidential for some 
action A’, and the derivation of D from D’ can disclose some 
property of D’, then the confidentiality of D in A is required. 
Security implication rules are specified as part of 
composition patterns only if their validity is formally proven. 
Proofs of security implication rules must have been 
constructed offline prior to the publication of a secure 
composition pattern and the use of the pattern in the service 
discovery and composition process. This is necessary as any 
attempt to construct proofs of rules at runtime, or equivalently, 
derive dependencies between security properties of aggregate 
workflows and individual workflow services from first 
principles is computationally expensive and, thus, impractical 
to do over and over again every time that the discovery 
process tries to instantiate a specific part of a workflow. 
Hence, we assume that the security implication rules have 
been formally proven before becoming part of the 
specification of a pattern and can therefore be safely used to 
infer the security properties of individual services when the 
pattern is applied. The process of constructing proofs of 
security implication rules is beyond the scope of this paper but 
interested readers may find examples of such proofs in [4]. 
To specify the security implication rules in patterns we use 
Situation Calculus (SC) [5]. SC is a first order logic (FOL) 
language introduced originally to model and reason about 
dynamical domains. In particular, SC may be viewed as a 
dialect of FOL, were the predicates that can have different 
truth values are called fluents. Each fluent is evaluated against 
a specific sequence of actions passed to them, called situation. 
The specification of security implication rules assumes that 
secure composition patterns and the information of the 
instantiated services in the workflow are also expressed in 
SC1. In particular, we use 
• the fluent next(A,A’) to specify that an activity A is 
followed by an activity A’ in the workflow of a pattern 
• the fluent input(A,D) (output(A,D)) to specify that D is an 
input (output) of activity A 
• the security-related actions of services 
• the fluent known(P, S) to specify that the security property 
P is already known to be satisfied (certified) in situation S. 
In this model the situations are the different traces of the 
workflow, and currAct(A) is the valid fluent when the 
reasoning step is on activity A. The reasoner walks through 
the workflow and at each step it is possible to check which 
security properties are required through the fluent 
requires(P,S).  
TABLE II 
EXAMPLE OF SECURITY IMPLICATION RULES 
PRECONDITION AXIOMS 
poss(step(A),S)↔ currAct(A’,S) ∧ next(A,A’) 
SUCCESSOR STATE 
currAct(A,do(α,S))↔ α = step(A) 
requires(conf(A,D),do(α,S))↔[α = step(A) ∧ (input(A,D) ∨ output(A,D)) 
∧ known(conf(A’,D’),S) ∧ derive(D’,D, ε) ∧ ε ≠ ∅ ∧ A’ ≠ A] 
∨ [α ≠ step(A) ∧ requires(conf(A,D),S)] 
 
Table II shows the specification in SC of the security 
implication rule that we introduce informally above. The first 
two rules are general rules that specify how the situation 
evolves. The actual rule for the confidentiality property is the 
third one, and it basically follows the explanation from before 
(the only addition is the part after the disjunction and it is a 
common solution to the frame problem in SC). 
Whilst applying a security composition pattern, the 
activities in the pattern should be instantiated based not only 
in finding services that match with the IO dependencies of the 
pattern but also with security conditions that may be 
associated with the particular activity. The exact security 
conditions required for each activity are inferred from: (a) the 
security properties that the composition which is being built 
by the pattern must satisfy, (b) the set of services that have 
been already bound to activities of the pattern and the actions 
that these services perform on data, and (c) the security 
implication rules.  
Security implication rules state which security properties 
would be required of the individual activities within a pattern 
in order to guarantee that a given security property of the 
composition defined by the pattern as a whole will also hold. 
The process of deriving the security properties that should 
hold for the individual services that can be bound to a pattern 
is discussed in Sect. IV below.  
 
1 This assumption is not restrictive since a high level, even graphical 
specification of patterns can be translated to the SC representation that we 
use for specifying and reasoning with security implication rules. 
 IV. COMPOSITION PROCESS  
The composition process focuses on building workflows 
through the application of the secure composition patterns. 
This process starts when no single replacement service has 
been found for a service S that needs to be discovered for an 
SBS and it is initially driven by the same discovery query (QS) 
that has been specified by the SBS designers to drive the 
single service discovery for S. More specifically, initially, the 
security conditions are collected from QS and the secure 
composition patterns that are known to guarantee security 
properties satisfying these conditions are retrieved. If no such 
pattern is found, then no replacement can be found for S. 
For each of the retrieved patterns, the process tries to find 
services that could be bound to each of the activities of the 
pattern. The search for candidate services for each activity 
may start from the initial or final activity of the pattern. Once 
an appropriate service for this activity is found the pattern is 
partially instantiated by binding the located service to the 
activity and then searching for bindings to the activities that 
are neighbors of the one of the instantiated activities. If more 
than one candidate services are found for the current activity, a 
different instantiation of the pattern is created by binding each 
of these services to the current activity and the composition 
process continues by considering each of these alternative 
instantiations. 
The security conditions required of the candidate services 
for an activity during the search are determined after finding 
the candidate services based on all the conditions of QS except 
those related to security. This is because security conditions 
may also depend on the actions that the services that will be 
bound to an activity perform, as we discussed in Sect. III. 
In the case of SSP, for example, if the confidentiality of the 
inputs IN to the workflow that will be created by the pattern is 
required, and a candidate service S for the activity A in the 
workflow is known to derive its output data (outA) from the 
inputs passed to it (inA) in a way that discloses information 
about these data (i.e., it is known that S performs the action   
Derive(inS,outS,{Type(inS)}), then two separate security 
properties will be required of S: (i) the confidentiality of its 
input data (conf(S,inS)) and (ii) the confidentiality of output 
data (conf(S,outS)). The second condition would not, however, 
be required if S did not derive its outputs from its inputs or the 
derivation of its outputs did not disclose any information about 
inS. Note that in this example, without regard to security 
conditions, to be a valid candidate service for A, S would have 
to store some data dS to an internal data store LS. Thus, if dS 
was also known to be derived from the inputs of S (i.e., it was 
known that S performs the actions Derive(inS,dS,{Type(inS)}) 
and Store(dS,LS) then the confidentiality of the persistent data 
of S, i.e. (conf(S,D)), would also be required for S to be a valid 
candidate for A. 
During the composition process, the exact security 
conditions to be checked for a candidate service of an activity 
are derived from the IO dependencies of the activity and the 
actions that the service performs, using the security 
implication rules of the pattern being applied. The check of 
whether the service complies with the security properties 
required from it is based on security certificates, created by 
some independent authority and published in a service registry 
[16]. Such certificates also confirm the actions that a service 
performs on data.  
As an example of the application of this process consider 
the example introduced in Sect. II and the generation of a 
composition to replace the car hire quotation service S. A 
pattern that can guarantee the confidentiality of the driver 
profile that will be given as input to this composition is the 
SSP pattern. The query to instantiate the first activity in SSP 
will then just require a service whose input is a subset of the 
input provided to S or, equivalently, a service with an input 
data type which is a supertype of the input data type of S. 
Suppose that the discovery for the first activity of SSP 
returns the service CompanyLoc. The activity A of SSP is then 
instantiated with this service (see Fig. 3(a)), if CompanyLoc 
complies with the security conditions derived for it from the 
pattern. In particular the initial security condition for S was 
that Person should be confidential. Thus, the security 
implication rules will infer that the confidentiality for 
CompanyLoc’s input Address is also required, as the latter is a 
projection of Person. Furthermore, since the output of 
CompanyLoc, namely BranchInfo, is derived from the driver’s 
Address data and can potentially reveal information about the 
Area part of the address, BranchInfo will also be required to 
be confidential.  This inference would be made by the rule of 
Table II, assuming that the action Derive(Address, 
BranchInfo, {Area}) is specified in a certificate within the 
description of CompanyLoc.  
Subsequently, the query for the second activity of SSP (B) 
is built. The IO dependencies of SSP require that the input of 
B is a subset of Person+BranchInfo. The security properties 
required for the replacement of S and the security implication 
rules would then require that Person and BranchInfo must be 
confidential.  
Suppose that a service called BrowseOffer, requiring just 
BranchID from BranchInfo, is located. The security 
implication rules can then infer that BranchID should be 
confidential (as a projection of BranchInfo). As shown in Fig. 
3(b), the prices that BrowseOffer outputs and stores in a 
persistent store don’t need to be confidential since as indicated 
by the certificate of BrowseOffer, prices are derived from 
BranchID but don’t disclose any information about it. 
 If the search for a service for a specific activity in a 
 
Fig. 3.  Example of progressive pattern instantiation. Data marked with (*) 
must be confidential according to security implication rules. 
 partially instantiated pattern fails, the composition process 
attempts to apply some composition pattern recursively in 
order to find a composition of services that could be bound to 
the activity of concern. This recursion may generate complex 
workflows as indicated in Fig. 4. 
 
Fig. 4. Recursive application of composition patterns. 
V. RELATED WORK  
Research dealing with security in service composition has 
focused on the verification of the security of existing 
compositions through model checking [6][7][8]. Our focus, 
however, is different since we are looking into applying 
composition patterns that are proven to guarantee security 
properties as part of a runtime service discovery and 
composition process. 
A work that is more related to ours is [9], where planning 
techniques are used to compose workflows that are compliant 
with some lattice-based access control models (e.g. multi-level 
secure systems). The focus of [9] is how to find efficient 
algorithms for sequential workflow planning whilst our 
approach is more general w.r.t both the types of workflows 
and the security properties that it covers. 
In [10] the authors describe an approach to security 
conscious web service composition through matching security 
constraints required for service provision and constraints 
declared by service providers. The security constraints in this 
approach are specified in SAML [11]. In [10], secure service 
compositions are generated based upon some pre-defined 
domain specific business workflows, whilst our approach 
allows the generation of arbitrary workflows. 
Other works on automatic service composition (e.g. 
[2][12][13][14]) allow the expression of security properties in 
discovery queries, usually as non-functional properties. These 
approaches focus on specific types of security properties and 
check them only against single services in compositions, 
without addressing the overall security of a composition. 
Aniketos project [15] also uses secure composition patterns 
(i.e. sets of rules) and checks them against existing 
composition plans. Aniketos patterns describe service 
configurations leading to either secure or insecure situations, 
and are used after the composition process, to check if a 
required security policy applies. In our work the security 
check is performed during the composition process driving it. 
Finally, our secure service composition patterns are similar 
to the workflow patterns in [3] as they specify elementary 
workflows that can be used to generate service compositions. 
However, our patterns include additional applicability and 
security properties.  
VI. CONCLUSION  
In this paper, we have presented an approach supporting the 
identification of secure service compositions, as part of 
runtime service discovery. Our approach is based on secure 
composition patterns. These patterns specify abstract service 
workflows, and the security properties that they are known to 
preserve if their constituent services have certain security 
properties. The logical connections between service and 
composition level security properties are expressed by security 
implication rules and the reasoning for deriving the former 
properties from the latter is based on modeling patterns, 
properties and security implication rules in Situation Calculus. 
Our work builds upon an existing runtime service discovery 
framework [17] and extends it with secure service 
composition capabilities. 
Currently, we are investigating the use of standardized 
languages, notably SAML, for expressing security properties 
and the development of an ontology to express properties at 
several granularity levels and dependencies between them.  
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